Skripsi
MANAJEMEN LABA, LEVERAGE, EFISIENSI INVESTASI : PERAN MODERASI KEPEMILIKAN ASING DI KAWASAN ASEAN
This study is grounded in the growing importance of investment efficiency as a determinant of the competitiveness of manufacturing firms in the ASEAN region, particularly in the context of increasing foreign capital inflows and heightened complexity in corporate governance structures. Earnings management and leverage are conceptualized as key financial policy instruments that may influence the quality of corporate investment decisions, whereas foreign ownership is commonly regarded as an external governance mechanism capable of shaping managerial behavior. This study aims to examine the effects of earnings management and leverage on investment efficiency, as well as to assess the moderating role of foreign ownership in manufacturing firms across the ASEAN region. This research adopted a quantitative approach using secondary data obtained from non-financial manufacturing firms in six ASEAN countries over the period 2014–2023. The final sample consisted of 846 unbalanced panel observations sourced from the Refinitiv database. Investment efficiency was measured using investment residuals, earnings management was proxied by discretionary accruals, leverage was operationalized using the debt ratio, and foreign ownership was measured as the proportion of equity held by foreign investors. Data analysis was conducted using panel data regression techniques and Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA), implemented with EViews 12. The empirical results indicated that earnings management showed a positive and significant effect on investment efficiency, whereas leverage demonstrated a negative and significant. In contrast, foreign ownership ddi not exhibit a significant direct effect on investment efficiency, nor did it moderate the relationship between earnings management and investment efficiency or between leverage and investment efficiency. These findings suggest that investment efficiency within ASEAN manufacturing firms is more strongly driven by accrual-based managerial discretion and debt-financing structures than by the presence of foreign shareholders as an external corporate governance mechanism.
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